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This paper investigates the in
ationary eects of scal policy in an opti-
mizing general equilibrium monetary model with capital accumulation, 
exi-
ble prices and wealth eects. The model is calibrated to Euro Area quarterly
data. Simulation results show that government decits, high debt level and
slow scal adjustment adversely aect price stability in the presence of an
independent monetary authority adopting a monetary targeting regime. The
mechanism through which scal policy aects the dynamics of the price level
presents monetarist properties, since the price level is determined in the
monetary market. The eects produced by scal expansions on price dynam-
ics are due to the behavior of consumers, facing a positive probability of death
and sharing the burden of scal adjustment with future generations. Fiscal
variables are shown to in
uence the consumption plan of individuals and the
demand for real money balances, thus aecting the equilibrium conditions in
the money market where the price level is determined.
JEL Classication Code: E31, E62.
Keywords: Price Stability, Fiscal Policy and Government Debt.
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The negative consequences of high government debt and decits on price
stability and the potential interrelations between scal and monetary policy
are a debated issue in the Euro Area. It is argued that the scal restric-
tions, dened in the Maastricht Treaty, are necessary for the ECB to pursue
the primary objective of price stability. The present paper illustrates how
government debt and decits might be linked to the price level dynamics in
a small structural model of analysis with overlapping generations.
The paper develops an optimizing general equilibrium monetary model
with capital accumulation, fully 
exible prices and wealth eects in which
the Ricardian Equivalence condition is not satised. The main purpose is
to analyze the in
ationary consequences of a scal expansion and to study
the role of wealth eects in the transmission mechanism from scal policy
to price level dynamics. In particular, in a simulation model, calibrated to
Euro Area quarterly data, this paper evaluates the implications on price
level dynamics and on other macro variables of increases in transfers to
households and in the level of public expenditure. All the scal experiments
are carried out under the assumptions that the government adopts a scal
rule that maintains a convergent path for public debt, while the rate of
money growth is set by an independent monetary authority.
The main mechanism through which scal policy aects the dynamics
of the price level can be illustrated as follows. Since the Ricardian Equiv-
alence condition is not satised, scal policy aects the consumption plan
and the timing of taxes alters the consumers' decisions. The changes in the
consumption plan, due to scal expansions, in
uence the demand for real
money holdings, thus aecting the equilibrium conditions of the monetary
market. Since the nominal stock of money is exogenously set by the mon-
etary authorities, the price level adjusts to guarantee the equilibrium. In
other words, scal policies indirectly aect the equilibrium conditions in the
money market in which the price level is determined. It is shown that the
eectiveness of this basic mechanism depends on:
 the nature of the scal expansion (transfers to households or increase
in public expenditure);
 the magnitude of the wealth eects;
 the level of the public debt-GDP ratio;
 the speed of scal adjustment.
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cally, the simulations show that temporary scal expansions neg-
atively aect price stability. Wealth eects enlarge the response of the price
level and of all the other variables to scal expansions. The price level path
is always above its long run trend during the adjustment process. In addi-
tion, economies with high public debt-GDP ratios and slow scal adjustment
experience larger price deviations after a scal expansion.
From the simulations it emerges that the eects produced by scal ex-
pansions on price level dynamics through wealth eects are minor. The rea-
son why the role of wealth eects seems small is that the model underlying
the simulations considers only a minimum deviation from Ricardian Equiv-
alence. It follows that the role of wealth eects is small by construction.
Nevertheless, the analysis provides insights into the linkages between scal
variables and the dynamics of the price level and illustrates the directions
in which wealth eects work.
The results of this paper provide extra reasons to promote scal conver-
gence in the Euro Area and to enforce the respect of both scal requirements,
the decit criterion and the debt criterion. In the light of this analysis, it
is argued that future research should evaluate the degree to which the Euro
Area deviates from Ricardian Equivalence. If Ricardian Equivalence does
not hold, then the lack of scal discipline will make the pursuit of price
stability more dicult and there will be additional reasons to enforce the
Stability and Growth Pact.
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The negative consequences of large government debt and decits on in
ation
and the possible interrelations between scal and monetary policy are a
central issue in the current macroeconomic policy debate. The Maastricht
Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact impose limitations on the size
of public debt and decits for each country in the Euro Area. It is argued
that scal discipline is a necessary condition for the ECB to pursue the
objective of price stability and there is also consensus on the need to take
into account both of the scal criteria dened in the Maastricht Treaty,
the decit criterion and the debt criterion1. From the present debate it
emerges that the independence of the central monetary authority would be
a necessary but not sucient condition to ensure price stability2.
The main aim of the present paper is to evaluate the in
ationary con-
sequences of a scal expansion and to provide a quantitative assessment
of wealth eects in a simulation analysis. In particular, this paper repre-
sents a rst attempt to quantify the eects of scal expansions on price
level dynamics and on other relevant variables via the wealth eects in a
simulation model, calibrated for the Euro Area, through the Yaari (1965)-
Blanchard (1985) framework of analysis. The basic model of analysis is a
non-stochastic discrete time monetary model of perpetual youth with capi-
tal accumulation and fully 
exible prices, where the Ricardian Equivalence
condition is not satised. The government is assumed to choose a sequence
of taxes according to a scal rule that maintains a convergent path for public
debt, given the monetary policy rule set by an independent authority. Both
the implications of increases in transfers to households and in the level of
public expenditure are considered.
The simulations carried out in this paper clearly show how scal policy
aects the dynamics of the price level and of other relevant variables. It
emerges that wealth eects enlarge the response of the price level and of all
the other variables to scal expansions. In particular, it is shown that the
price level path is always above its long run trend during the adjustment
process. Moreover, the results suggest that economies with high public
debt-GDP ratios and slow adjustment are likely to experience larger price
deviations after a scal expansion.
1A protocol to the Treaty sets the budget decit threshold at 3% of the GDP and the
public debt at 60% of the GDP.
2The public debt requirement has received renewed attention and there is wide po-
litical consensus on the importance of reducing the public debt-GDP ratio at a suitable
pace towards the 60% reference value. See European Commission (2003a) and European
Central Bank (2003).
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forward. In a few words, the main mechanism at work behind the observed
results, can be synthesized as follows. Since the Ricardian Equivalence con-
dition is not satised, the consumption plan of individuals depends on the
timing of taxes. It follows that scal expansions are shown to always alter
the consumption plan of individuals. This change in the consumption plan
alters the demand for real money balances. Since the nominal supply of
money is exogenously set by the monetary authorities, the price level must
change to restore the equilibrium in the money market. In this sense the
mechanism through which scal policy aects the dynamics of the price level
displays entirely monetarist properties.
The eects produced by scal expansions on price level dynamics through
wealth eects, however, seem to be minor. The magnitude of the simulations
results is driven by the departure of the economy from Ricardian Equivalence
which, in the present model, is assumed to be small. Nonetheless, the paper
shows the directions in which the wealth eects work in transmitting the
eects of a scal expansion from the changes in the consumption plan to
the monetary market and stresses the importance for future research of
investigating the role of wealth eects and the departure from the Ricardian
Equivalence condition in the Euro Area. The Yaari-Blanchard framework,
in fact, is shown to provide an additional perspective to discuss the Stability
and Growth Pact and oers extra reasons to promote scal convergence in
the Euro Area.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 relates the present paper
to the economic literature. Section 3 presents the basic monetary model
with overlapping generations and capital accumulation; Section 4 describes
calibration; Section 5 illustrates simulation results for dierent scal ex-
periments. Section 6 concludes and summarizes the main ndings of the
paper.
2 Related Literature
A well known result since Sargent and Wallace (1981) is that scal policy
matters for price stability, since large decits and increasing government
debt may eventually force the central bank to issue money to ensure sol-
vency. In a seminal paper Aiyagari and Gertler (1985) study the in
ationary
eects of high current public decits in an optimizing general equilibrium
model when they are expected to be nanced by future money creation. In a
stochastic monetary model Leeper (1991) shows under which circumstances
the eects of monetary policy on prices depend on the scal rule adopted by
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1995) and Sims (1994), the 'scal theory of the price level' (FTPL) has
become increasingly popular in providing a theoretical framework able to
identify the conditions under which scal policy alone determines in
ation
dynamics. Specically, the FTPL distinguishes between Ricardian and non-
Ricardian scal regimes, in the terminology of Woodford (1995): in the rst
case the nominal anchor is provided by monetary policy and the price level
is determined in the monetary market, while in the second case scal policy
serves as the nominal anchor and determines the price level. In other words,
in the Ricardian regime scal policy is irrelevant for the determination of
the price level and the intertemporal budget constraint of the government
necessarily holds regardless of the time path of the price level. Conversely,
in a non-Ricardian regime prices and not decits adjust to satisfy the in-
tertemporal budget constraint of the government. From this point of view
the FTPL shows under which circumstances the time path of the price level
is determined by the needs of scal solvency and provides a theoretical ra-
tionale supporting the idea that the respect of the scal criteria, dened in
the Maastricht Treaty, is necessary for price stability. This theory, appealing
as it might be, has been seriously questioned by Buiter (2002) and McCal-
lum (2001). In particular, both authors criticize the 'scalist' proposition in
the case of a non-Ricardian regime. McCallum claims that in this case the
solution for the price level outlined by the FTPL is not unique and shows
the existence of an alternative monetarist solution, based on fundamentals,
as suggested by the minimal-state-variable approach. Buiter argues that
the FTPL is misspecied, since it denies that the intertemporal government
budget constraint must hold as an identity and assumes that it needs to be
satised only in equilibrium. Buiter shows that this feature of the FTPL is
a source of internal contradictions and anomalies.
The role of scal decits in determining in
ation dynamics has also been
investigated in optimizing general equilibrium models with wealth eects.
The Yaari (1965)-Blanchard (1985) model has been used in several contribu-
tions3 and has become increasingly popular as a basic framework of analysis
to study the interrelations between monetary and scal policies. See for
example Marini and Van der Ploeg (1987), Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000)
and the modied version  a la Weil proposed by Detken (1999) who uses the
Blanchard-Weil OLG model to address the question of intergenerational fair-
ness and interprets the Stability and Growth Pact "as an intergenerational
contract safeguarding the interests of future generations". The implications
3See Heijdra and Van der Ploeg (2002) for an exhaustive survey.
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(2002) in a continuous time version of the Yaari-Blanchard model with en-
dogenous labor supply and sticky prices. In fully 
exible price models Annic-
chiarico and Marini (2003a, 2003b) provide an alternative perspective and
show that high public debt and decits are in
ationary by aecting money
market equilibrium through the wealth eects, even when the intertemporal
budget constraint of the government is satised for any sequence of prices
and there is no money nancing of public decit4.
This paper presents an extension of the Yaari-Blanchard model to pro-
vide a link between scal policy and the dynamics of the price level. In this
sense the model presented could be included in the class of models proposed
by the FTPL. Nonetheless, the mechanisms at work in our framework are
monetarist, since the price level is always determined in the monetary mar-
ket and the intertemporal budget constraint of the government is always
satised for any sequence of prices. From this point of view the model pre-
sented is standard and is solved along the lines of the monetarist approach.
All policy experiments, in fact, are carried out under the assumption that
scal authorities adopt a tax rule which guarantees solvency, without any
recourse to any of the revaluation mechanisms characterizing the FTPL,
which have been the object of the main critiques, as explained above5.
3 The Basic Model
Consider the following optimizing general equilibrium monetary model in
discrete time with production and overlapping generations6. The economy
is populated by four types of agents: consumers, rms, the monetary au-
thority and the government. The demand side of the economy is an ex-
tended version of the Yaari-Blanchard model of perpetual youth. Money
yields transaction services and enters the consumers' utility function along
the lines of Sidrauski (1965) and Brock (1975)7. The dynamic behavior of
4Their approach to the problem provides a monetarist perspective that could be dened
as a 'money market scal theory of the price level'.
5In this sense we assume a scal regime which, in the terminology of Woodford (1995),
is Ricardian. However, in our framework this terminology can be a source of confusion,
since in the present model the Ricardian Equivalence condition is not satised.
6Smets and Wouters (2002) use a discrete time version of the Yaari-Blanchard frame-
work in an open economy, calibrated to Euro Area data, to study the implications for the
optimal monetary policy of an imperfect pass-through.
7Real money balances entering as an argument of the utility function are a common
feature of several contributions extending the Blanchard-Yaari framework to monetary
models. See for example Marini and Van der Ploeg (1988), Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000,
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cal capital accumulation process, which results from the saving decisions of
the nite lived consumers and from the expenditure decisions of an innite
lived public sector. Prices are assumed to be fully 
exible and lifetime is
uncertain. For a given monetary policy rule the government nances its
purchases by levying taxes and by issuing bonds, so as to always satisfy the
intertemporal budget constraint.
3.1 Consumers
The demand side of the economy is composed of cohorts of dierent ages
and population is assumed to be constant over time. All agents face the
same probability of survival between two consecutive periods, 
 > 0, and
have the same preferences. For simplicity, the size of total population is
normalized to one; hence the proportion of population dying and being
born at the end of each period is 1   
: Since lifetime is uncertain and
there is no bequest motive, agents sell their contingent claims on their non-
human wealth to life insurance companies. In each period agents receive a
fair insurance premium, while in the case of death all their wealth goes to
insurance companies. Competition among insurance companies implies that
the net return on the insurance contract is
1 


 . All agents face the same
sequences of taxes and labor income and decide on consumption, real money
holdings and wealth accumulation. Total non-human wealth is composed of
real money balances, physical capital and government bonds. Labor income
and taxes are assumed to be independent of age. Finally, newly born agents
are assumed not to hold any assets.
The representative agent of the generation born at time s faces a lifetime
utility function of the form
U =
1 X
t=0
(
)t log[(cs;t)(ms;t)1 ] (1)
where 0 <  < 1; 0 <  < 1 is the subjective discount factor, cs;t and
ms;t denote consumption and real money balances at time t. The budget
constraint of the representative agent of generation s is
cs;t + as;t + ms;t = ws;t   s;t +
1



ms;t 1
1 + t
+ (1 + rt 1)as;t 1

(2)
2002). See also Cushing (1999) who presents a discrete time version of the Blanchard-Yaari
monetary model.
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s;t denote real wage income and lump-sum taxation in period
t; respectively; as;t is the individual's real non-monetary wealth, as;t = ks;t+
bs;t, where kt;s and bs;t stand for physical capital and real government bonds
at the end of period t8; rt 1 is the real interest rate between period t   1
and t and t is the in
ation rate dened as t = Pt
Pt 1  19. Market eciency
and absence of uncertainty ensure that the rates of returns on capital and
government bonds are equalized. The representative consumer of generation
s chooses a sequence fcs;t;ms;t;a;s;tg
1
t=0 in order to maximize (1) subject to
(2). The solution to the dynamic optimization problem yields the following
conditions
cs;t+1 = 
Rt 1
Rt
cs;t (3)
cs;t =
it
1 + it
ms;t (4)
together with the solvency constraint
lim
t!1

tRt(as;t + ms;t) = 0 (5)
where  
1 
 , (3) is the optimal path for individual consumption, (4) is
the portfolio equilibrium condition, it is the nominal interest rate and Rt
is the interest factor, which is composed of one-period real interest rates
compounded from period 0 to period t
Rt =
1
(1 + r0)(1 + r1)(1 + r2):::(1 + rt)
(6)
where by denition
Rt 1
Rt = 1 + rt. The nominal interest rate represents the
opportunity cost of real money holdings and the Fisher equation holds at
all times
(1 + it) = (1 + t+1)(1 + rt) (7)
The closed form solution for the optimal choice of individual consumption
is
8This timing convention is common in monetary economics and implies that money
acquired in period t by the representative agent born at time s is ms;t. Real money
balances are assumed to yield transaction services within the period. On this issue see
Obstfeld and Rogo (1996), chapter 8.
9It should be noted that the budget constraint (2) incorporates the premium paid by
insurance companies to the consumer which amounts to
1 



h
ms;t 1
1+t + (1 + rt 1)as;t 1
i
.
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1   

1 + 

1



ms;t 1
1 + t
+
Rt 1
Rt
as;t 1

+ ht;s

(8)
where ht;s is the human wealth, dened as the present discounted value of
future labor incomes net of taxes
ht;s =
1 X
v=0

vRt+v
Rt
(ws;t+v   s;t+v) (9)
Since the size of the cohort born at time s at time t is (1   
)
t s, the
aggregate value for a generic economic variable, say xs;t; can be obtained as
Xt =
t X
s= 1
xs;t(1   
)
t s (10)
where upper case letters denote aggregate values.
Aggregation of all generations gives the following expressions for aggre-
gate consumption and the portfolio balance condition10
Ct =
1   

1 + 

Mt 1
1 + t
+ (1 + rt 1)At 1 + Ht

(11)
Ct =
it
1 + it
Mt (12)
where aggregate human wealth is dened as
Ht =
1 X
v=0

vRt+v
Rt
(Wt+v   Tt+v) (13)
The aggregate budget constraint is
Ct + At + Mt = Wt   Tt +
Mt 1
1 + t
+ (1 + rt 1)At 1 (14)
The dierence equation describing the time path of aggregate consumption
is11
Ct = (1 + rt 1)Ct 1  
1   



(1   
)
(1 + )

Mt 1
1 + t
+ (1 + rt 1)At 1

(15)
10The portfolio balance condition characterizes the demand for real money holdings,
which is increasing in consumption and decreasing in the nominal interest rate (i.e. the
opportunity cost of real money balances).
11A specic feature of the Yaari-Blanchard framework is that the time path of aggregate
consumption depends on total wealth. See Blanchard (1985). Setting 
 = 1, consumption
evolves according to the standard Euler equation.
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The supply side of the economy is described by a standard neoclassical
constant return production function in labor and physical capital. Output
at each time period t; Yt, is given by
Yt = AF(Kt 1;Lt) (16)
where Lt is the labor force employed by the rms and A is a measure of
total factor productivity assumed to be constant and normalized to one for
simplicity. For all K;L > 0; F() is such that
F(0;L) = 0; Fk(K;L) > 0; FKK(K;L) < 0
and
lim
K!0
FK(K;1) = 1
lim
K!1
FK(K;1) = 0
Since the marginal product of labor is always positive and leisure is not an
argument of the utility function, all population is employed at the optimum
and Lt = 1 for each t. Physical capital depreciates at a constant rate
 2 (0;1): Competitive prot-maximizing rms equate the marginal product
of capital to the user cost of capital, (rt + )
AFK(Kt;1) = rt +  (17)
and output is equal to factor payments
Yt = AF(Kt 1;1) = (rt 1 + )Kt 1 + Wt (18)
3.3 The Monetary Authority
The monetary authority is assumed to choose its policy rule independently.
We assume that a strict monetary targeting rule is adopted, that is that
the nominal money stock evolves according to an exogenously given rate of
growth t: Real money balances are then described by
Mt =
1 + t
1 + t
Mt 1 (19)
In this monetary regime the long run level of the in
ation rate is given
by the rate of money growth, while short run in
ation is endogenously de-
termined and responds to changes in exogenous variables.
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The government, for a given monetary policy, is assumed to choose the
sequence of taxes and public expenditure in order to always satisfy the in-
tertemporal budget constraint. The 
ow budget constraint of the govern-
ment is given by
Bt = (1 + rt 1)Bt 1 + Gt   Tt   Mt +
Mt 1
(1 + t)
(20)
where Gt is public expenditure12. Equation (20) says that public expendi-
tures and interest payments can be nanced by taxes, issuance of new bonds
and seigniorage. The solvency constraint precluding Ponzi's game requires
that
lim
t!1
RtBt = 0 (21)
Conditions (20) and (21) imply that the government satises its intertem-
poral budget constraint for a given monetary policy. The current value of
the government's liabilities is equal to the present discounted value of cur-
rent and future budget surpluses for any sequence of the price level, nominal
interest rate and money stock. The scal authority can be dened as Ricar-
dian, in the sense of Woodford (1995).
The sequence of public expenditure fGtg1
t=0 is exogenously given, while
the sequence of lump-sum taxes fTtg1
t=0 is an increasing function of public
debt
Tt = Bt   Zt (22)
where  > 0 and fZtg1
t=0 is an exogenous sequence of positive transfers13.
The parameter  is chosen in order to ensure a convergent path of the gov-
ernment debt and can be interpreted as the speed of scal adjustment of
taxes to real public debt changes. In fact, the larger , the greater the
eects on taxation of an increase in the public debt.
12It should be noted that the government is assumed to issue fully indexed bonds. In
the FTPL class of models the government is assumed to issue also or exclusively nominal
debt.
13The feedback rule (22) is a form of wealth tax and was introduced by Blanchard (1985)
in his original contribution. Ganelli (2002) shows under which circumstances the wealth
tax is not sucient to ensure saddle-path stability.
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Equilibrium is given by the market clearing conditions and by the eciency
conditions for consumers and rms, under the above dened monetary and
scal rules. The dynamic competitive equilibrium is described by the fol-
lowing system of dierence equations
Ct = (1 + rt 1)Ct 1  
1   



(1   
)
(1 + )

Mt 1
1 + t
+ (1 + rt 1)(Bt 1 + Kt 1)

(23)
Kt = AF(Kt 1;1) + Kt 1(1   )   Ct   Gt (24)
Bt = (1 + rt 1)Bt 1 + Gt   Bt + Zt   Mt +
Mt 1
(1 + t)
(25)
Mt = (1 + t)(1 + rt 1)(Mt 1   Ct 1) (26)
where (23) is the dierence equation describing the time path of consump-
tion; equation (24), obtained by combining (14), (18) and (20) describes
the accumulation of physical capital; (25) is the budget constraint of the
government incorporating the scal rule; equation (26), obtained from the
Fisher equation combining the portfolio condition (12) with the monetary
rule (20), describes the equilibrium condition in the money market. The
price level adjusts in order to clear the money market.
In the absence of changes in the level of transfers and of public expen-
diture the economy converges to a steady state denoted by C; K; B and
M. In steady state the in
ation rate is equal to the rate of growth of the
nominal stock of money,  = .
3.6 Model Solution
In this Section the non-linear system (23)-(26) is approximated by a rst
order Taylor expansion around the steady state and technology is assumed
to be given by
Yt = AF(Kt 1;1) = AK
t 1 (27)
with  2 (0;1). In particular, the model is log-linearized so as to obtain a
linear system of dierence equations where variables are expressed in terms
of percentage deviations from the steady state.
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written as

S b St+1 = 
L
S b St + 
"b "t+1 (28)
b "t+1 = b "t (29)
where each element of vectors b St and b "t; say Xt, is expressed as b Xt =
ln(Xt
X ) ' Xt X
X . The relevant matrices of the system are dened as

S =
0
B B B
@
K
Y 0 0 C
Y
0 1

1+
M
B 0
0 0 1 0
0 0
1 



1 

1+
1
1+
M
C 1
1
C C C
A

L
S =
0
B
B B
@
 + (1   )K
Y 0 0 0
 (1   )(r + ) 1 + r    0 0
!31 0 (1 + )(1 + r) !34
!41 !42 0 (1 + r)
1
C
C C
A
with
!31  (1 + )(1   )(r + )( C
M   1)
!34   (1 + )(1 + r) C
M
!41   
1 



1 

1+ (1+r)K
C +
1 



1 

1+ (1 )(r+)(B
C + K
C ) (1 )(r+)
!42   
(1 
)(1 
)
(1+)
 (1 + r)B
C

" =
0
B B B
@
 G
Y 0
G
B
Z
B
0 0
0 0
1
C C C
A
 =
 
G 0
0 Z
!
Matrix  presents the autoregressive coecients of the shocks and indi-
cates how exogenous scal variables evolve over time.
The log-linearized model (28)-(29) can be solved by applying the Blanchard-
Kahn (1980) algorithm. In particular b Kt and b Bt are predetermined variables
and c Mt and b Ct are forward looking variables. The solution, describing the

uctuations of the economic variables of the system around their steady state
values in response to changes in public expenditure and transfers, takes the
following form
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b S2;t = b S1;t + 	b "t (31)
where b S1 and b S2 are the subvectors of endogenous states and of forward
looking variables, respectively. The elements of the matrices ;; and
	 depend on the underlying parameters and on the critical ratios of the
model14.
In order to better understand the dynamic properties of the model in re-
sponse to changes in b "t, we characterize the dynamics of three other forward
looking variables (the in
ation rate, the price level and the nominal interest
rate) and of another predetermined variable (the real interest rate).
The path for the in
ation rate and for the price level as percentage
deviations from their trend are
e t+1 = b t+1 =  (1 + )c Mt+1 + (1 + )c Mt (32)
b Pt =  c Mt (33)
where e t+1 = t+1   . Finally, the time path for the real and the nominal
interest rate as deviations from their steady state levels are
e rt = rt   r = (r + )(   1) b Kt (34)
e it = it   i = (1 + r)e rt + (1 + )e t+1 (35)
The time path of the nominal interest rate turns out to be crucial in
the determination of the equilibrium conditions in the money market and
in the characterization of the eects produced by scal expansions in the
simulations.
Computations are performed under the assumption that the rate of
money growth is constant over time, that is t =  for each t.
4 Calibration
In order to analyze the response to changes in the level of transfers and
public expenditure, we calibrate the parameters of the model using Euro
14The numerical solution of the model is reported in the Appendix.
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of a year15.
Private consumption share C=Y = 0:57 is the average ratio of nal
consumption of households to GDP for the period 1991-2001. Public expen-
diture share, set equal to G=Y = 0:20; and transfers share, Z=Y = 0:26; are
dened as the average ratios of nal consumption of general government to
GDP and of current transfer to GDP, respectively. The average annual ratio
of GDP and of the monetary aggregate M1, Y=M, for the period 1997-2001
is 3.32.
We set the rate of growth of the nominal stock of money to 2% per
annum16. For the Euro area the average labor share is approximately 0:69
and is the average of the compensation per employee as a percentage of
GDP for the period 1991-200117. The implied value for the parameter  is
then 0:31. The real interest rate is set equal to 3% per annum. Finally, we
calibrate the probability of survival between two consecutive quarters to be
0:98518.
In the benchmark economy the annual public debt to GDP ratio is set
equal to 0:6 and the parameter of the scal rule  is chosen in order to ensure
public solvency19. The model is also solved for an economy characterized
by a larger annual government debt-GDP ratio, 1:0620. It should be noted
that the high debt economy diers from the low debt one in three important
aspects: rst, the level of the steady state human wealth is lower, the amount
of taxes necessary to sustain a high public debt being larger as a percentage
of GDP21; second, the parameter of the scal rule, , is smaller, implying
that the speed of adjustment of taxes with respect to public debt is lower;
third, the time path of aggregate consumption, described by equation (23),
15The Euro Area Data Source is the ECB Statistical DataBank. Tables 2.04, 5.01 and
7.01 of the Euro Area Statistics have been used.
16In this simplied model the rate of money growth determines the steady state level
of the in
ation rate. Considering a 2% target for the in
ation rate, the rate of money
growth is set accordingly.
17See European Commission (2003b), Table 32.
18The choice of this parameter is crucial for the results. The positive probability of
death is the only source of heterogeneity in this model.
19The steady state quarterly public debt-GDP ratio is then equal to 2.4.
20Italy and Belgium present the largest government debt as percentage of the GDP
among the Euro Area countries. In 2002 Italy and Belgium's annual government debt-
GDP ratios were 106.7 and 105.4, respectively.
21In steady state the sustainability of a high level of debt requires a larger amount of
total taxation to be levied on households. It follows that human wealth, as dened in (13),
is lower for consumers in the high public debt country, the 
ow of future labor income
they face being the same.
is substantially altered by the high public debt.
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absence of wealth eects, that is setting the probability of survival between
two consecutive periods, 
; equal to one. In this case Ricardian Equivalence
prevails and aggregate consumption evolves according to the standard Euler
equation.
Table 1 summarizes the underlying parameter values, long run properties
of the economy in the three cases and the implied values for the rate of time
preference , the rate of depreciation  and the parameters  and 22.
5 The Response of the Economy to Fiscal Expan-
sions
This Section reports the responses of the economy to scal expansions.
Specically, increases in transfers to households and in public expenditure
are considered in turn. The scal changes analyzed are assumed to bring
on impact the scal decit as a percentage of the GDP to 3% and 6%. All
the experiments are carried out under the assumptions that the economy is
initially in steady state and that scal expansions are nanced entirely by
issuance of new bonds and future taxes.
5.1 Increase in Lump-Sum Transfer
Figures 1 and 2 plot the responses of the economy to an increase in transfer
payments to households which decays with an autoregressive coecient of
0.95.
In the rst place, consider the reactions of the relevant economic variables
in the benchmark economy, described by the continuous lines. A positive
change in transfers leads to an increase in consumption on impact, while
real money balances negatively deviate from their steady state level. During
the later phases of the adjustment consumption is below its long run level.
Physical capital reduces gradually and then starts to increase again, but
is always below its steady state level during the adjustment process. For a
constant rate of nominal money growth, all deviations of real money balances
from the steady state, observed during the adjustment process, are due to
movements in the price level. In other words, after the expansion, the price
level deviates from its trend. In particular, the price level jumps on impact
by 0.022% and then follows a bell shaped path, as shown in Figure 1. The
22Full derivation of the implied parameter values is reported in the Appendix.
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is 0.049% and the maximum deviation is 0.066%.
These results can be explained as follows. When Ricardian Equivalence
is not satised, an increase in the level of transfers to households augments
the human wealth of current generations, which fully benet from the scal
expansion and share the burden of taxation with as yet unborn cohorts. For
this reason total consumption jumps upwards on impact and then starts
to decrease. After the scal expansion the nominal interest rate jumps up-
wards and is always above its steady state level along the adjustment path.
The nominal interest rate is, in fact, a forward looking variable whose level
depends on a weighted average of future real interest rates. At the same
time the real interest rate is anchored to the level of capital, whose accu-
mulation process is governed by consumption. In this sense all the observed
dynamics are triggered by changes in the consumption plan. Consider now
the eects on the money market. The initial increase in consumption boosts
the demand for real money balances on impact, while the increase in the op-
portunity cost of real money holdings depresses the demand for money. The
negative eect prevails, hence we observe a downward jump in the demand
for real money balances. Afterwards both eects are negative and therefore
real money balances are always below their steady state level. Since the
nominal money supply growth rate is kept constant, during the adjustment
process the price level path must be above its long run level to ensure the
equilibrium in the money market. In this sense a temporary increase in
transfers alters the equilibrium conditions in the monetary market and the
time path of the price level.
The dotted lines indicate the responses of the economy to an increase
in transfers when simulations are carried out neglecting wealth eects (i.e.
setting the probability of survival between two consecutive periods to 1). In
the absence of wealth eects Ricardian Equivalence prevails and the timing
of taxes does not aect the time prole of consumption. An increase in
transfers only aects the time path of public debt during the adjustment
process23. In this case the real and the nominal interest rates are constant
over time and the equilibrium in the monetary market is unaected by the
scal expansion. The paths of public debt with and without wealth eects
are virtually identical, as shown in Figures 1 and 2.
The dashed lines illustrate the responses of economic variables to the s-
cal expansion under the assumption that the steady state annual government
23An increase in transfer payments, nanced by new bond issue and future taxes, is
considered a pure 'Ricardian experiment'.
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larger than those observed in the low debt economy. The price level jumps
on impact by 0.041 % in Figure 1 and by 0.092% in Figure 2. Results show
that scal expansions tend to be more in
ationary in economies with higher
debt to GDP ratios.
The intuition behind this nding can be explained as follows. The policy
experiment is conducted in such a way that two economies share the same
characteristics and dier only in the public debt-GDP ratio and in the im-
plied value of the scal parameter of adjustment, , which is lower in the
high debt economy. In this case consumers pay a large amount of taxes and
the level of their steady state human wealth is lower than that of individuals
in a low debt economy. However, the same increase in transfers determines
a larger increase in human wealth in the high debt economy. Since the low
scal adjustment spreads the burden of future taxation across a larger num-
ber of cohorts, individuals initially benet from the transfer increase in a
large measure and boost their consumption more. On the other hand, the
nominal interest rate increases more than in the low debt economy. This
major change in the consumption plan of individuals, in fact, determines
larger deviations of all the other economic variables from their steady state
levels in response to the scal expansion. The same mechanism explained
above is at work, but the eects produced by the scal expansion on the
demand for real money balances are now larger, hence a greater change in
the time path of the price level is required to restore the equilibrium.
5.2 Increase in Public Expenditure
Consider now the eects of an increase in public expenditures. Figures 3 and
4 plot the responses of selected variables to a temporary increase in public
expenditure which brings on impact the budget decit-GDP ratio to 3% and
6%, respectively. The autoregressive coecient is again assumed to be 0.95.
As before, we consider rst the responses of the benchmark economy, with
low debt and wealth eects, described by the continuous lines.
In Figure 3 the expansion generates a decrease in consumption of 1.52%;
the nominal interest rate increases on impact and the price level jumps
upwards by 1.70%. The demand for real money balances reduces on impact
as consequence of the decline in the level of consumption and of the increase
in the opportunity cost of real money holdings. Since the rate of nominal
money growth is kept constant, the equilibrium in the monetary market
is restored by an upward jump of the price level path. Physical capital is
crowded out by public debt and is below its steady state level during the
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state value. All the eects are larger in Figure 4, where a higher change in
public expenditure is considered.
The dotted lines indicate the percentage deviations of the relevant eco-
nomic variables with no wealth eects. Initially wealth eects amplify the
responses of the nominal interest rate, of the price level and of capital to
increases in public expenditure, while they dampen the eects on consump-
tion. An increase in the level of public expenditure still crowds out private
consumption in the representative agent framework, but consumption is less
reduced on impact when current generations expect to share the burden of
taxation with future generations (human wealth of current generations de-
creases less in the economy with wealth eects). At a later stage however,
the situation is reverted. The 'excessive' consumption, due to the presence of
wealth eects, determines a larger negative eect on capital accumulation,
and therefore less resources are available for consumption at later stages.
The nominal interest rate of the economy with wealth eects deviates in a
larger measure from the long run level than that of the economy in which
Ricardian Equivalence condition holds. The larger opportunity cost for real
money holdings explains why we observe a larger deviation of the price level
path in the economy with heterogeneity.
The dashed lines illustrate the responses of a high debt economy to a
temporary increase in the level of public expenditure of the same amount.
The downward jump in consumption is smaller than in the low debt case,
because current consumers suer a smaller reduction in their human wealth.
Since the scal adjustment is slower, taxes are more smoothed across gen-
erations and individuals initially reduce their consumption level less. As
explained above, a larger consumption level during the earlier stages deter-
mines larger negative eects on capital and reduces the resources available
for consumption during the later stages. The nominal interest rate is larger
than in the low debt economy, as expected. Again the demand for real
money balances is lower and the deviation of the price level from the steady
state path is larger.
***
This model introduces wealth eects among agents and the time path of
consumption depends on wealth and on the time path of taxes. An increase
in transfers alters the time prole of taxes and, via wealth eects, in
u-
ences consumption. An increase in public expenditure crowds out private
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geneity. Changes in consumption plans and in the nominal interest rate alter
the demand for real money balances. Under the assumption of a constant
rate of money growth, the price level deviates from its trend to clear the
money market. In other words, the eects produced by scal variables on the
price level are due to the consumers behavior facing a positive probability of
death. Consumers alter their consumption plan in response to scal changes
and their choices are shown to depend on the speed of scal adjustment and
on the level of the public debt. These eects are rather important quan-
titatively in the second experiment, where public expenditure crowds out
consumption in any case (even when 
 = 1) and triggers a pervasive process
of adjustment in the whole economy. Wealth eects explain the dierence
in the magnitude of these responses in the three economies considered in
the simulations. On the other hand, the magnitude of the eects produced
by the scal expansion on the price level path and on the other economic
variables is minor in the rst experiment. The reason is that simulations
are based on a model in which the only source of heterogeneity is a positive,
but low, probability of death. This paper, in fact, expressly considers the
minimum deviation from Ricardian Equivalence, theoretically achievable in
a microfounded optimizing general equilibrium model. The wealth eects
described by the simulations must then be small by construction24.
The departure from Ricardian Equivalence considered in the model, al-
beit small, is sucient to show the directions in which wealth eects work
in providing a link between scal variables and the dynamics of the price
level. It would be interesting to investigate the magnitude of the wealth
eects and the relative consequences for economic policies in the Euro Area,
without any presumption ex ante on the nature of these eects.
6 Conclusions
The Stability and Growth Pact imposes limitations on the size of public
debt and of budget decit in each country of the EMU. Constraints on s-
cal policy are considered by policy makers to be necessary to safeguard the
ECB credibility and to ensure price stability. In the absence of scal limita-
tions, in fact, political pressures might arise to nance budget decits with
seignorage and to monetize public debt. The Yaari-Blanchard model oers
an additional perspective to discuss the Stability and Growth Pact. From
24For a survey on the empirical literature on the observed deviations from Ricardian
Equivalence see Mankiw and Elmendorf (1999).
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enforce scal convergence in the Euro Area and the respect of both scal
requirements: the decit criterion and the debt criterion.
We have presented a small structural model showing the role of wealth
eects in aecting the dynamic response of the economy to scal expansions
entirely nanced by future lump-sum taxation. In particular, this paper
shows how temporary scal expansions aect the equilibrium conditions in
the money market and negatively aect price stability. Overall the results
suggest that wealth eects enlarge the response of the price level to scal
variables. The price level path is always above its long run trend during
the adjustment process. Budgetary policies need not be intertemporally un-
balanced to explain the correlation between scal variables and price level
dynamics. All the results are obtained under the assumption of 
exible
prices, so that the good's market is always in equilibrium and the price level
has to change in response to a scal expansion to equilibrate the money mar-
ket. In other words, the excess of real money supply requires an increase in
the price level to clear the money market during the adjustment. Moreover,
the model indicates that wealth eects amplify the crowding out of physi-
cal capital due to excessive public debt along the adjustment path, but the
quantitative results of the simulations are obviously driven by unrealistic
assumptions and the role of wealth eects is minor by construction. It also
emerges that public debt-GDP ratio and the degree of scal adjustment
in
uence the responses of the economy to a scal expansion. Economies
with higher public debt ratios and slow scal adjustment experience larger
deviations of the price level from its trend after a scal expansion.
This result of the analysis is in line with the renewed attention paid by
policy makers to the respect of the debt criterion in the Euro Area and with
the insistent recommendations to national governments to run down public
debt towards the 60% of GDP reference value at an adequate pace.
This paper clearly shows the directions in which wealth eects work and
the characteristics of the distortionary eects of scal policy and of high
public debt. However, simulation analyses are based on a theoretical model
which considers only a small departure from Ricardian Equivalence and
wealth eects do not seem to signicantly aect prices. Given these results,
the natural question to address is the following: does Ricardian Equivalence
hold in the Euro Area? If not, then there is an additional concern for the
monetary authorities and there are extra reasons to enforce the Stability
and Growth Pact. Loose scal policies and the lack of scal convergence
would make it more dicult the pursuit of price stability. Equilibrium in
the money market would in fact be substantially altered by scal expansions
ECB • Working Paper No 285 • November 2003 25and a whole new game between scal and monetary authorities would open
up.
Finally, the model presented, based on several simplifying hypotheses,
can be used as benchmark for future investigations. Extensions should incor-
porate additional sources of heterogeneity other than a small probability of
death, which is the only departure from the representative agent framework
considered in the present paper. In addition, dierent scal adjustment rules
could also be taken into account to analyze the responses of the economy to
a scal expansion. Some form of price stickiness could be introduced into
the model, in order to better analyze the short run implications of scal
policy. Finally, the model could consider dierent monetary regimes, such
as in
ation targeting or interest rate rules.
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Average Ratios
C=Y = 0:57
G=Y = 0:20
Z=Y = 0:26
4Y=M = 3:32
Baseline parameter values

 = 0:985

NW = 1
 = 0:310
r = 0:007
 = 0:005
Implied parameter values
60% = 0:999
106% = 0:999
NW = 0:993
 = 0:020
 = 0:026
60% = 0:198
106% = 0:115
Other ratios
K=Y = 11:32
B=Y60% = 0:60  4
B=Y106% = 106  4
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Steady state conditions and implied parameter values
In steady state equations (18) and (24) can be re-written as

K
Y
= 1  
C
Y
 
G
Y
(1A)
1 = (r + )
K
Y
+ (1   ) (2A)
The rate of depreciation  and the capital/income ratio must satisfy both
conditions. It follows that
K
Y
=

r
  (1  
C
Y
 
G
Y
) (3A)
 =
(1   C
Y   G
Y )

r   (1   C
Y   G
Y )
(4A)
The subjective discount factor  is given by equation (23) in steady state
 =
C
Y (1 + ) +
1 


 [ 1
1+
M
Y + (1 + r)A
Y ]
(1 + r)(1 + )C
Y + (1   
)[ 1
1+
M
Y + (1 + r)A
Y ]
(5A)
The coecient  is derived from equation (26)
 =
M
C
r + (1 + r)
(1 + )(1 + r)
(6A)
Finally, the critical parameter of the wealth tax must be chosen so as to
keep the budget constraint of the government (25) on balance
 = r +
G
B
+
Z
B
 
M
B
(1  
1
1 + 
) (7A)
Model solution
The relevant matrices that describe the model solution under the assumption
of an annual government debt-GDP ratio equal to 60% are the following
60% =
 
:9728  :0002
 :0206 :8091
!
60% =
 
 :0107  :0003
:0815 :1025
!
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:6949  :0003
:7093 :0045
!
	60% =
 
 :1449  :0024
 :1292 :0050
!
In the absence of wealth eects the relevant matrices are
NW =
 
:9732 0
 :0206 :8091
!
NW =
 
 :0101 0
:0815 :1025
!
NW =
 
:6997 0
:6997 0
!
	NW =
 
 :1413 0
 :1413 0
!
Finally, under the assumption of an annual government debt-GDP ratio
equal to 106% the solution is described by the following matrices
106% =
 
:9732  :0005
 :0198 :8920
!
106% =
 
 :0109  :0004
:0461 :0580
!
106% =
 
:7011  :0018
:6990 :0119
!
	106% =
 
 :1483  :0044
 :1252 :0075
!
The above matrices have been used to generate the responses of any
variable in the vector b S to any of the changes in the vector b " under the
assumption that autoregressive coecients are
 =
 
:95 0
0 :95
!
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On Impact Decit-GDP=3%
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On Impact Decit-GDP=6%
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